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THE NONOBVIOUSNESS OF INVENTIONS: IN
SEARCH OF A FUNCTIONAL STANDARD
Abstractr The Patent Act of 1952 introduced the nonobviousness requirement into pat-
entability analysis. Historically vague, the nonobviousness requirement remains poorly
defined. Courts currently use a variety of tests for nonobviousness, none of which cor-
rectly reflects the requirement's constitutional and technical role. This Comment proposes
a functional standard embodying four elements: constitutional policy, technical advance,
logical analysis, and active perspective.
"Well, " said Owl, "the customary procedure in such cases is as follows"
"What does Crustimoney Proseedcake mean?" said Pooh. "For I am a
Bear of Very Little Brain, and long words Bother me " "It means the
Thing to Do." '"As long as it means tha4 I don't mind," said Pooh
humbly.'
Alexander Graham Bell, Thomas Edison, Henry Ford-they and
hundreds of thousands of other inventors have held patents granted by
the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO). What qualities
do their inventions have that make them worthy of patent protection?
United States patent laws define several patentability requirements.
Lurking at the core of those laws is the mysterious nonobviousness
requirement. Essentially, the requirement asks whether the invention
would have been obvious to a hypothetical person of ordinary skill in
the art faced with the actual inventor's problem. Nonobviousness tests
the degree of technical advancement that deserves patent protection.
Frequently at issue in patent litigation, nonobviousness is a require-
ment in need of an improved standard.
Understanding nonobviousness requires studying both its use by the
Supreme Court and the differing use of nonobviousness by other
courts. The Supreme Court applies a strict, policy-based test,
grounded in logical analysis. The Court focuses on technical advance-
ment, viewing the inquiry from the position of a person of ordinary
skill actively analyzing the prior art. The Court recently labelled its
approach a "readily deduced" standard. The lower courts and the
PTO measure nonobviousness with intuitive tests, assessing sugges-
tion, motivation, desirability and expectation. Policy concerns receive
little mention. Under the lower court standards, the person of ordi-
nary skill plays a passive role, acted upon by a body of knowledge.
Used interchangeably and without explanation, the lower court tests
are of indeterminate strictness and involve irrelevant inquiries. The
confusion resulting from this plethora of standards is best exposed by
1. A.A. MILNE, WINNIE-THE-POOH 50 (1961).
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analyzing both the ordinary meanings of the standards and their
application.
All courts should adopt the policy-based, deductive approach used
by the Supreme Court to test for nonobvious technical advancement.
The correct test should protect public knowledge, test technical devel-
opment only, and direct a logical and active analysis of the prior art.
Patent laws exist to further certain policies, and the interpretations of
the legal requirements for patentability should reflect those policies.
Also correct are the Court's logical approach and the active role the
inventor plays in the deductive process. The Supreme Court's stan-
dard should, however, undergo one change. By describing the stan-
dard in terms of ready deduction, the Court suggests that the
nonobviousness threshold is low. Because the underlying policy con-
cerns demand a strict standard, a standard of logical deduction would
improve the Court's approach. Rephrasing the standard prevents
undermining restrictive policies. Directing a more mechanical inquiry
than lower court tests, the logical deduction standard is easier to apply
and less likely to generate wrong results. The logical deduction stan-
dard thus defines a functional test for nonobviousness. In essence, it
describes "the Thing to Do."
I. PATENTABLE INVENTION
A. The Legal Requirements
The United States Constitution empowers Congress to enact patent
laws.2 The 1952 Patent Act enunciates the current requirements of
patentability: utility, novelty and nonobviousness.3 A relatively low
threshold standard, the section 101 utility requirement demands only
that inventions be socially useful.4 In addition to utility, patentable
inventions must also meet the novelty test as defined by sections
102(a), (e) and (g).5 Courts and inventors face a relatively uncompli-
2. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 grants Congress the power "[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries .... "
3. 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-03 (West 1984 & Supp. 1990), respectively, define the utility, novelty
and nonobviousness requirements.
4. 1 D. CHISUM, PATENTS § 4.02, at 4-3 (1990). 35 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 1984) provides:
"Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor,
subject to the conditions and requirements of this title."
5. 35 U.S.C.A. (West 1984). The novelty subsections (a), (e) and (g) of section 102 describe
the sources, known as prior art, that are used to determine if the invention claimed is patentably
novel. The invention must not be "anticipated" by any single piece of that prior art. Prior art




cated task when applying and meeting the utility and novelty require-
ments.6 The nonobviousness requirement, on the other hand, presents
those courts and inventors with an ambiguous and difficult hurdle.7
B. Nonobviousness: The Ultimate Condition of Patentability
Despite its intangible nature, the nonobviousness test has three
established characteristics. The first, the measurement of technical
advancement, provides a useful beginning for understanding nonobvi-
ousness. It defines the role nonobviousness plays in determining how
an invention measures against knowledge already in the public
domain. The second, the constitutional policy directing strict scrutiny
of inventions in order to prevent capture of knowledge already in the
public domain, provides the degree of scrutiny for courts to use when
applying the first characteristic of the nonobviousness test. The third,
that nonobviousness is a judicially developed doctrine, illustrates how
courts interpret, and misinterpret, this elusive requirement. The cur-
rent judicial interpretations lack an accurate, functional standard for
nonobviousness.
Nonobviousness measures technical advancement. Section 103
directs an objective determination of whether a person of ordinary
skill in the art would view the invention at issue as an obvious deriva-
tive of the prior art.' The nonobviousness requirement tests for the
presence of innovation beyond that involved in creating a merely new
and printed publications anywhere in the world. The single prior art source is said to
"anticipate" if it exactly describes and enables what the inventor is now claiming as the
invention. See D. CIsuM, supra note 4, § 3.01, at 3-4; see also id, § 3.02[1], at 3-11 to 3-12
(illustrating use of the term "prior art").
6. See D. CHISUM supra note 4 ("Generally, it is an easy matter to demonstrate a sufficient
human purpose for mechanical products and processes."); see also id, § 3.02[1] at 3-11 to 3-12
("Novelty is a liberal test in the sense that it is fairly easy for an inventor through careful
definition of his claim to avoid products and processes in the prior art.").
7. Section 103 provides in part:
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or described
as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the difference between the subject matter sought to
be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been
obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to
which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in
which the invention was made.
35 U.S.C.A. § 103 (West Supp. 1990). See generally, NONOBVIousNEss-THE ULTIMATE CON-
DITION OF PATENTABILrrY (J. Witherspoon ed. 1980) [hereinafter NONOBVIOUSNESS] (provid-
ing several essays describing the history and difficulty of the nonobviousness requirement).
8. 35 U.S.C.A. § 103 (West Supp. 1990) (section 103 measures the differences between the
prior art and the subject matter sought to be patented).
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device. 9 The inventor's initial recognition that a problem needs solv-
ing is not part of the nonobviousness determination. 0 Rather, the test
focuses on the qualities of the ultimate invention. Nor are the manner
of invention or individual characteristics of the inventor relevant."'
Nonobviousness prevents patents from capturing knowledge already
in the public domain. 2 Under Constitutional mandate, patent laws do
not reward socially useful inventions or inventions requiring great
investment of resources unless those inventions are also nonobvious.13
In essence, the interest in safeguarding available knowledge outweighs
the interest in rewarding obvious technical development, no matter
how costly or useful. The Supreme Court frequently refers to the pol-
icy of knowledge protection in its nonobviousness decisions.' 4 In con-
trast, the nonobviousness decisions of the Federal Circuit rarely
mention policy concerns.'"
9. "A patent monopoly may issue only for those literally new solutions that are beyond the
grasp of the ordinary artisan who had a full understanding of the pertinent prior art." 2 D.
CHISUM, supra note 4, § 5.01, at 5-6.
10. The law deems that the hypothetical person of ordinary skill in the art faces the same
problem as the actual inventor. See, eg., id § 5.04[1], at 5-210.
11. "Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the invention was made."
35 U.S.C.A. § 103 (West Supp. 1990); see also Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 15 n.7
(1966) ("Although some writers and lower courts found in the language connotations as to the
frame of mind of the inventors, none were so intended .... It was the device, not the [process of]
invention, that had to reveal the 'flash of creative genius.' ").
12. See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc. 489 U.S. 141, 150 (1989)
("Taken together, the novelty and nonobviousness requirements express a congressional
determination that the purpose behind the Patent Clause are best served by free competition and
exploitation of that which is either already available to the public, or that which may be readily
discerned from publicly available material."). Deeming the hypothetical person of ordinary skill
in the art with knowledge of all prior art relevant to the invention, no matter how obscure, also
reflects the policy of protecting the prior art. Cf. 2 D. CHISUM, supra note 4, § 5.0411], at 5-212,
5-213.
13. See Rich, The Vague Concept of "Invention" as Replaced by Section 103 of the 1952 Patent
Act, in NONOBVIOUSNESS supra note 7, at 1:401, 1:415 ("[C]ompliance with 103 is the policy
judgment of Congress on how to bring the invention within the Constitutional purpose.").
14. See, e.g., Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57, 61 (1969)
(citing Graham); Graham, 383 U.S. at 6.
15. A search of 1985-91 Federal Circuit cases fails to unearth nonobviousness decisions that
mention protecting knowledge in the public domain. The Federal Circuit more frequently refers
to protection of knowledge in the public domain in its patentability decisions based on statutory
bars and its infringement decisions based on the doctrine of equivalents. See, e.g., King
Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853, 860 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal
Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 870 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Reference to constitutional policy is more common in




Nonobviousness embodies a judicially developed standard. 6
Appearing for the first time in the 1952 Patent Act,17 courts previ-
ously referred to nonobviousness as invention." The legal character
of invention eluded great minds of patent law.19 The desire to replace
invention as a patentability test in great part motivated the drafting of
the 1952 Patent Act.20 The Act's authors thought they were providing
a clearer, more mechanical test for patentability in the nonobviousness
requirement.21 Section 103 purportedly defined a bright line between
patentable and unpatentable inventions.22 Twenty-five years after the
Act's passage, however, Judge Giles Rich lamented the requirement's
failure to operate as the authors had hoped.23 Frequent litigation of
nonobviousness reflects the importance and inaccuracy of the present
tests for the requirement.24
C. Judicial Interpretation of the Nonobviousness Requirement
The nonobviousness requirement owes its origins and interpretation
to the United States Supreme Court.25 In its 1850 Hotchkiss v. Green-
wood decision, the Court introduced the concept that patentability
required inventiveness beyond that of a mechanicof ordinary skill.26
16. See, eg., Rich, Why and How Section 103 Came to Be, in NoNoBvIousNEss, supra note 7,
at 1:201, 1:206-11. The Supreme Court decided the cornerstone nonobviousness case in 1850.
See Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1850). For procedural information on
court review of patent cases, see 3 D. CHSUM, supra note 4, § 11.06[3].
17. The 1952 Patent Act as currently amended appears at 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-376 (West 1984
& Supp. 1990).
18. See Rich, supra note 16, at 1:201, 1:206.
19. For example, Judge Learned Hand declared, "[Invention] is... as fugitive, impalpable,
wayward, and vague a phantom as exists in the whole paraphernalia of legal concepts." Harries
v. Air King Prods., Co., 183 F.2d 158, 162 (2nd Cir. 1950).
20. See Rich, supra note 16.
21. Id. at 1:209, 1:213.
22. Id. The inventions at issue must also possess utility and novelty 35 U.S.C.A. § 101-02
(West 1984).
23. See Rich, The Vague Concept of"Invention" as Replaced by Section 103 of the 1952 Patent
Act, in NONOBVIOUSNESS, supra note 7, at 1:401. Judge Rich sits on the Federal Circuit and
participated in the drafting of section 103. NONOBVIOUSNESS, supra note 7, at 1:1 & n.2.
24. See Dunner, Introduction, 13 AIPLA Q. 185 (1985) (documentation of issues appealed to
the Federal Circuit); 3 D. CImsuM, supra. note 4, § 11.06[3][c], at 11-198; Note, A Proposal to
View Patent Claim Nonobviousness from the Policy Perspective of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
52(a), 20 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 1157, 1158-59 (1987), see also 2 D. CHiSUM, supra note 4,§ 5.02[6], at 5-68. Confusion stems in part from the nature of nonobviousness, however another
source of confusion is whether obviousness is a question of law or of fact. See eg., id,
§ 5.02[5][h]; Note, supra at 1159-60.
25. For a survey of Supreme Court nonobviousness decisions, see 2 D. CHiSUM, supra note 4,
§ 5.02, at 5-7 to 5-68.
26. 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248, 265 (1850) (patentability requires "more ingenuity or skill...
than that possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business").
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That concept forms the basis for the section 103 nonobviousness
requirement.27 The Court relied on Hotchkiss when interpreting sec-
tion 103 in Graham v. John Deere Co. 2s The Court stated that the
Constitution defines patentability, and Congress must follow the con-
stitutional directive in any patent legislation.2 9 The Graham Court
stressed that the nonobviousness test is defined by the way it functions,
not by what it is called. 3' The Court clarified that section 103 main-
tained the degree of required innovation defined by previous case
law.31 The Court also elaborated the three-part nonobviousness test
the Federal Circuit uses today.32 The Graham Court declared that the
nonobviousness requirement is an ultimate legal conclusion based on
three factual inquiries.3 3 The fact finder must assess: (1) the scope
and content of the prior art; (2) the differences between the prior art
and the claims at issue;3' and (3) the level of ordinary skill in the art
at the time the invention was made. In addition, courts consider
objective evidence of obviousness, if any.35
27. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 3 (1966) ("mhe 1952 Act was intended to codify
judicial precedents embracing the principle long ago announced by this Court in Hotchkiss v.
Greenwood ....").
28. Id. at 14-17.
29. Id. at 5-6 (Congress's power "is limited to the promotion of advances in the 'useful arts,'
.... Congress may not authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent
knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free access to materials already available").
Both copyright and patent laws stem from the same constitutional source. U.S. CoNsT. art. I,
§ 8, cI. 8. The Court recently enunciated the importance of constitutional policy in copyright
decisions. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282, 1288, 1295 (1991)
(O'Connor, J.) (the Court refused to grant copyright protection on the basis of "sweat of the
brow," requiring that the requisite constitutional level of originality be present).
30. 383 U.S. at 12 ("The Hotchkiss formulation, however, lies not in any label, but in its
functional approach to questions of patentability.").
31. Id. at 4 (section 103 did not change the "level of innovation necessary to sustain
patentability").
32. See Note, supra note 24, at 1163.
33. 383 U.S. at 17. Some confusion surrounds the question whether nonobviousness is a
question of law or fact. See supra note 24.
34. Claims are one sentence descriptions of the invention. The language of the claims defines
the metes and bounds of the invention. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 112 (West 1984).
35. Objective evidence of obviousness includes, but is not limited to, evidence of long-felt
demand and commercial success. See Note, Subtests of "Nonobviousness"." A Nontechnical
Approach to Patent Validity, 112 U. PA. L. RaV. 1169 (1964). For a sense of the importance of
secondary considerations to the practicing attorney (and perceived difficulties inherent in the
Graham test), see Baechtold, How To Sell Nonobviousness and Obviousness, 258 PAT.
LITIGATION 1988 511, 542 (Prac.L.I.) ("Tell a judge whose chemistry background was a high
school science survey course 40 years ago that he must decide whether an invention using
advanced recombinant genetic techniques would have been obvious to an 'ordinary' Yale post-
doctoral fellow and he will pray for a motion to transfer.").
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Analysis of Hotchkiss and Graham reveals how the Supreme Court's
nonobviousness test functions in practice.36 After determining the
components of the inventions, the Court determined the operational
characteristics of the components and analyzed how those components
were used in the prior art. The Court then decided whether a person
of ordinary skill, aware of the characteristics and past uses of the com-
ponents, would combine them as the inventor had done.37 Function-
ally, the Court determined whether a person of ordinary skill in the
art, faced with the inventor's problem and aware of all relevant knowl-
edge, would arrive logically at the inventor's solution.
Many commentators characterize twentieth century Supreme Court
nonobviousness decisions as overly strict.38 Several cases illustrate
that if an invention is a combination of prior art, the Court will scruti-
nize it very closely.39 Such close scrutiny reflects the Court's alle-
giance to the policy of protecting publicly held information from
capture by patents. 40
36. In Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1850), the inventor crafted a clay
doorknob. Other clay and porcelain doorknobs were known and the claimed doorknob
previously existed made of metal and wood. Id In Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1
(1966), the inventor modified a plow design to decrease wear to the shank. The modified plow
was found to be an obvious derivative based on two prior art plow designs. The Court found that
the mechanical advantage provided by the prior art arrangement was exactly the same as that
provided by the rearrangement in the inventor's plow. Id at 19-26.
37. See Graham, 383 U.S. at 25 ("[A] person having ordinary skill in the prior art, given the
fact that the flex in the shank could be utilized more effectively if allowed to run the entire length
of the shank, would immediately see that the thing to do was what Graham did .... ");
Hotchkiss 52 U.S. at 265 (the invention "is the substitution of a knob of a different material from
that heretofore used in connection with this arrangement").
38. See generally 2 D. CSisuM, supra note 4, § 5.02[3], § 5.02[5], at 5-56.
39. See, ag., Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950)
(introducing the scrutinize-with-care policy). The scrutinize-with-care policy was reaffirmed by
the Court in Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 281 (1976). See 2 D. CHISUM, supra note 4,
§ 5.02[5], at 5-63; see also Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57
(1969) (patent denied); Cuno Eng. Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84 (1941) (patent
denied). BothAnderson's-Black Rock and Cuno involved inventions that were useful and simple
uses of preexisting technology. Use of a radiant heater to fuse sections of asphalt in Anderson's-
Black Rock used the heater in its designed fashion. 396 U.S. at 58-60. The pop-out cigarette
lighter operated by using a thermostat device that automatically decoupled when reaching the
critical temperature. The same type of thermostat was used in toasters and irons. Cuno, 314
U.S. at 85-89.
40. See supra notes 12, 14 and accompanying text; see also 5 J. BocHNovIc, THE INVENTIVE
STEP, STUDIES IN INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY AND COPYRIGHT LAW 24 (1982) ("From the origin
of the patent system in 1790... up to the present day, the essential nature of the requirement has
been a public interest consideration to be balanced in each case against the grant of a patent
monopoly.").
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The Court's most recent statement regarding nonobviousness
appeared in Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.41 Address-
ing an issue of pre-emption of state intellectual property law by federal
patent laws, Justice O'Connor introduced the opinion with a concise
and instructive discussion of the policies and statutes governing pat-
entability.42 The discussion emphasized the constitutional policy of
protecting knowledge in the public domain.43 Using language new to
Supreme Court patent jurisprudence, Justice O'Connor framed the
nonobviousness inquiry in terms of what a person of ordinary skill in
the art would readily deduce or readily discern based on the prior
art.' The Court relied on its opinion in Graham to support this con-
clusion, although the Court did not state the nonobviousness standard
in terms of ready deduction in Graham.45 Presumably, the Court con-
sidered the readily deduced or discerned standard to exist implicitly in
the Graham v. John Deere Co. opinion.
Several different interpretations of the nonobviousness requirement
enjoy regular use in the lower courts." The four most common non-
obviousness "formulations" are suggestion,47 motivation,48 suggestion
of desirability,49 and reasonable expectation of success. 50 Courts use
41. 489 U.S. 141, 150 (1989) ("The nonobviousness requirement extends the field of
unpatentable material beyond that which is known to the public under § 102, to include that
which could readily be deduced from publicly available material by a person of ordinary skill in
the pertinent field of endeavor.").
42. Id. at 141-50.
43. "[Ihe stringent requirements for patent protection seek to ensure that ideas in the public
domain remain there for the use of the public." Id. (quoting Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co.,
440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979)).
44. Id. For purposes of clarity, the Supreme Court standards are referred to as "the readily
deduced standard" during most of the remaining discussion.
45. See id; cf. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
46. See, e.g., Gillette Co. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 919 F.2d 720, 723 -24 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
("As to whether 'clear suggestion' is a proper test of obviousness . . . [v]arious other
formulations of the requisite level of suggestion for combining prior art disclosures have been set
forth in our precedent."); see also 2 D. CHisuM supra note 4, § 5.04[l][e]; 2 LIPSCOMB'S
WALKER ON PATENTS § 6:5 (Supp. 1990).
47. See, eg., Cable Elec. Prods., Inc. v. Genmark, Inc., 770 F.2d 1015, 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
("I[T]he test is what the combined teachings of the references would have suggested to those of
ordinary skill in the art.").
48. See, e.g., In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688, 692 (Fed. Cir. 1990) ("[S]tructural similarity
between claimed and prior art subject matter, proved by combining references or otherwise,
where the prior art gives reason or motivation to make the claimed composition, creates a prima
facie case of obviousness ...."), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1682 (1991).
49. See, e.g., Hodosh v. Block Drug Co., 786 F.2d 1136, 1143 n.5 (Fed. Cir.) ("Mhe
references must be considered as a whole and suggest the desirability and thus the obviousness of
making the combination."), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 827 (1986).
50. In re O'Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 904 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("For obviousness under § 103, all
that is required is a reasonable expectation of success.").
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the formulations singly and in combination." Courts apply the rea-
sonable expectation of success standard with the most predictability.52
Otherwise, courts state no rationale when applying one formulation or
another, or several in combination. 3 Generally, courts recite the facts
involved, mention a standard and proceed to declare their legal
conclusion.5 4
II. MISINTERPRETATION OF THE NONOBVIOUSNESS
REQUIREMENT
A. Courts Do Not Use An Appropriate Functional Standard
The various standards that courts invoke to measure the nonobvi-
ousness requirement are imprecise and unfocused. The Supreme
Court's readily deduced standard unites similar ordinary and func-
tional legal meaning, providing a workable tool for measuring techni-
cal advancement. However, the Court's readily deduced standard
does not properly reflect the strict policy concerns underlying its non-
51. See, ag., In re Mills, 916 F.2d 680, 682 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (For the modification of an
apparatus to be obvious, "there must be a suggestion or motivation in the reference to [make the
modification]."); Merck & Co. v. Biocraft Laboratories, Inc., 874 F.2d 804, 809 (Fed. Cir.)
("[P]atentability is not imparted where 'the prior art would have suggested to one of ordinary
skill in the art that this process should be carried out and would have a reasonable likelihood of
success .... ' ), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 498 (1989); In re Geiger, 815 F.2d 686, 688 (Fed. Cir.
1987) ("Obviousness cannot be established by combining the teachings of the prior art to produce
the claimed invention, absent some teaching, suggestion or incentive supporting the
combination."). In addition to the interchangeability of the formulations, different types of
patents are meant by the courts to be legal equivalents. Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713
F.2d 1530, 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("There is no warrant for judicial classification of patents,
whether into 'combination' patents and some other unnamed and undefined class or otherwise.
Nor is there warrant for differing treatment or consideration of patents based on a judicially
devised label.").
52. Reasonable expectation of success is commonly used in "obvious-to-try" fact settings.
See ag., In re O'Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 903 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("Obvious-to-try" situations are
typically those in which many parameters need to be varied to find successful conditions and "the
prior art [gives] either no indication of which parameters [are] critical or no direction as to which
of many possible choices is likely to be successful."). Other "obvious-to-try" situations are those
in which a promising new technology exists with "only general guidance as to the particular form
of the claimed invention or how to achieve it." Id.
53. The Federal Circuit recently decided an infringement appeal brought on the basis of
confusion regarding nonobviousness standards. See Gillette Co. v. S. C. Johnson & Son, Inc.,
919 F.2d 720 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Gillette alleged that the district court applied a "clearly suggests"
standard rather than a "mere suggestion" standard. Id. at 723. The Federal Circuit panel
declined to clarify the correct nonobviousness standard, citing numerous opinions using "clearly
suggests" language, and proceeded to review the district court's judgment de novo. Id. at
723-24. In its own analysis, the court apparently was applying a suggestion standard, although
the opinion is unclear on which standard was applied. The court affirmed the district court's
holding of nonobviousness. IM at 726.
54. See, eg., id,
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obviousness determinations. The formulations of lower courts are
ambiguous because the standards overlap, vary in the degree and qual-
ity of scrutiny required, and embody factors irrelevant to technical
advancement. In addition, the lower court standards do not reflect the
Supreme Court's policy-based approach.
Clear arid precise patentability tests would decrease litigation and
better fulfill the policies underlying patent law." Precise communica-
tion of legal standards plays an essential role in patent protection.
When courts express standards in terms with more than one meaning,
or those terms are misleading or irrelevant, litigation will increase. 6
Standards misdirecting the courts will not properly protect knowledge
in the public domain.57 A precise standard is therefore central to cor-
rectly interpreting and applying the law.
Each current standard fails to display at least one of four essential
facets of a correct, functional test for nonobviousness: strictly protect-
ing knowledge in the public domain, measuring only technical
advancement, logical analysis, and an active rather than passive role
for the person of ordinary skill in the art.
B. First Level Analysis Examines Ordinary Meanings
The various formulations courts use to test for nonobviousness pres-
ent a confusing range of ordinary meanings. Analysis of the ordinary
meaning of the Supreme Court's readily deduced standard is relatively
straightforward. Suggestion, motivation, desirability and expecta-
55. See, e.g., R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 513, 514, 527-29 (1986) (discussing
the effect of vague, inefficient, and indefinite rules on litigation frequency and social goals).
56. Id.
57. See, e.g., infra note 77 and accompanying text. In addition, policy goals may not be met if
inventors forego litigation. Cf. R. POSNER, supra note 55, at 492 (suggesting that a victim of
unlawful and thus inefficient conduct engages in a variety of resource consuming activities in
preparation for a possible trial). Posner notes that most cases are settled before trial, as the
victim assesses whether it is more cost efficient to proceed to trial or settle. Id. at 523-24.
However, where the perpetrator of the inefficiency is a judge, the only "settlement" option is to
forego litigation and thus restitution, altogether. See id. at 528 (discussing the role played by
stare decisis in perpetuating inefficient rules).
58. Obvious means "easily discovered, seen, or understood; readily perceived by the eye or
the intellect .. " BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 972 (5th ed. 1979); see also WEBSTER'S THIRD
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, UNABRIDGED 1559 (1961)
[hereinafter WEBSTER'S]; VII THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 41 (1961) [hereinafter
OED]. Deduce means "To derive or draw as a conclusion from something already known or
assumed; to derive by a process of reasoning or inference; to infer." III OED, supra, at 115; see
also WEBSTER'S, supra, at 589. Discern means "To recognize as distinct; to distinguish or
separate mentally (one thing from another) .... To distinguish one thing or fact by the intellect;





tion, on the other hand, do not lend themselves to simple "one stan-
dard at a time" analysis. Rather, various groupings of the lower court
standards best expose the similarities and differences between them. 9
Were it not for the misleading nature of "readily," the Supreme
Court's readily deduced standard would provide a correct, functional
nonobviousness test. The Supreme Court's readily deduced standard
closely matches the ordinary meaning of obvious. Readily deduced,
readily discerned, and obvious each denote similar intellectual reac-
tions of the person of ordinary skill in the art. All describe an active
role for the hypothetical person of skill assessing the prior art. These
three standards assess nonobviousness from the perspective of the per-
ceiver. The analysis focuses on the intellectual reaction of the person
of ordinary skill. Prior art is relevant to the inquiry, but is not
endowed with activating, stimulating abilities. The active role of the
hypothetical person mimics the actual inventive process. Readily
deduced, readily discerned, and obvious direct a logical analysis of the
prior art, leading necessarily to a logical conclusion. The approach
directs a narrowing analysis. The person of ordinary skill in the art
starts with a broad range of prior art and narrows it by deducing an
idea from it. Unfortunately, these standards denote rapid, uncompli-
cated responses, incorrectly implying a non-stringent approach to
nonobviousness. 60
The lower courts' suggestion, motivation, desirability and expecta-
tion standards denote qualities and degrees of scrutiny different from
each other and different from obvious.61 These standards describe
intuitive, open-ended reactions.62 In addition, most lower court stan-
59. Suggestion means "presentation of an idea especially indirectly, as through association of
ideas .... It is in the nature of a hint or insinuation, and lacks the element of probability. Facts
which merely suggest do not raise an inference of the existence of the fact suggested, and
therefore a suggestion is much less than an inference or presumption." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY, supra note 58, at 1285; see also X OED, supra note 56, at 119; WEBsTER'S, supra
note 58, at 2286. Motive means "[clause or reason that moves-the will and induces action ....
'Motive' is the moving power which impels to action for a definite result .... 'Motive' is that
which incites or stimulates a person to do an act." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 58, at
914; see also II A SUPPLEMENT To THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1051 (1976);
WEBSrER'S, supra note 58, at 1475. Desire means "[tlo ask, to request. Ordinarily, to wish for
more or less earnestly." BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY, supra note 58, at 403. Desirable means "of
such properties or qualities as to be wished for or sought . ..worth seeking or doing as
advantageous, beneficial, or wise." WEasTER's, supra note 58, at 612. See also III OED, supra
note 58, at 246. Expect means "[t]o await; to look forward to something intended, promised, or
likely to happen." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 58, at 517; see also III OED, supra
note 58, at 424; WEBSTER'S, supra note 58, at 799.
60. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
61. See infra notes 67, 68, 75-88 and accompanying text.
62. See, ag., infra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
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dards give the person of ordinary skill a passive role-the prior art is
the actor.6a
A major flaw in the lower court standards is that suggestion, desira-
bility and motivation incorrectly imply that knowledge and inventive
stimuli exist inherently in the prior art.' Invention apparently occurs
when the inventor is acted upon by the inherent knowledge or stimuli
contained in the prior art. The standards focus on the prior art con-
tent that is the basis for the inventive conclusion, rather than the
action of deduction.
Suggestion and reasonable expectation of success direct an open-
ended, indeterminate approach to nonobviousness. Under the sugges-
tion standard, for example, the person of ordinary skill expands on or
responds to a hint or implication in the prior art and, through an
undefined process, reaches the invention. Under the expectation stan-
dard, the person of ordinary skill awaits a likely outcome, the expecta-
tion occurring at the beginning of the inventive process.65 In research,
unforeseen and intervening events alter the course of expected events.
The degree of unpredictability of these future events clouds correct
application of the expectation standard.66 Although both embody an
open-ended approach, suggestion and reasonable expectation are
inconsistent with one another as well. Reasonable expectation reflects
something that is, at least, likely to happen.67 Suggestion, on the other
hand, is not necessarily predictive of likelihood.68
63. See infra note 64 and accompanying text.
64. See supra note 59; see also In re Newell, 891 F.2d 899, 901 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("That which
may be inherent is not necessarily known.") (quoting In re Spormann, 363 F.2d 444, 448
(C.C.P.A. 1966)).
65. Determining whether a person of ordinary skill in the art would readily deduce the
invention also, of course, focuses on the time when the invention was conceived. However, by
framing the question in terms of logical deduction, the focus of the inquiry is clearer. Possible
intervening future events are not overemphasized in the mind of the person determining the
nonobviousness of an invention.
66. Cf. infra note 91 (citing cases where unpredictability was an issue).
67. The court relies on the reasonable expectation of success test when explaining that the
prior art need not provide absolute predictability to support finding an invention obvious. See,
e.g., In re O'Farrell, 853 F.2d 894 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
68. See supra note 59 (defining suggestion). Neither is suggestion necessarily linked to
inference and deduction. See supra note 59 (defining deduction). "[A]n inference is a deduction
of fact that may be logically and reasonably drawn from another fact or group of facts found or
otherwise established .... BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 58, at 700 (citing Cal. Evid.
Code). But see WEBSTER's NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 590 (1973) (the fourth definition of




Motivation and suggestion of desirability overlap and contradict
each other.69 Although what would motivate a person of ordinary
skill in the prior art to create a particular invention may correlate with
the advantages and benefits of the invention, the standards approach
the question in different ways. Whether the prior art would motivate
focuses on how information stimulates an individual. Whether the
prior art suggests desirability focuses on the useful nature of the
invention.
Further comparisons between the lower court standards expose
other disparities. A hint or implication of an invention to one of ordi-
nary skill-a suggestion-does not necessarily equal content in the
prior art that would urge or impel the same ordinary person to pro-
ceed toward the same end-motivation. Similarly, inquiring whether
a person of ordinary skill proceeded, looking forward with a reason-
able degree of assurance toward success, is not the equivalent of an
inquiry into whether the prior art hints at or implies the desirability of
the outcome. None of these described standards necessarily equals the
inquiry into whether a person of ordinary skill would readily deduce
the invention.
Perhaps confining courts to a single nonobviousness standard will
unduly constrain the judicial process, however, the present confusing
standards offer a much less effective alternative. Multiple ways of
phrasing the same question can give a court flexibility in dealing with
the variety of factual knots it must unravel.7' The standards should all
stand if, in fact, they merely represent different "formulations" of non-
obviousness, all embodying the same meaning.7' However, the plain
69. In addition, neither standard on its face directs a logical, deductive approach to the
nonobviousness problem. See supra note 59 (defining motive and desirability).
70. Judge Newman recently reiterated the Federal Circuit position regarding the absence of a
general rule for obviousness: "No one precedent or rationale can be controlling in all possible
areas of human creativity." In re Eli Lilly & Co., 902 F.2d 943, 947 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Judge
Rich similarly stated the Federal Circuit position in In re Durden: "iT]here are those who would
like to have us state some clear general rule by which all eases of this nature could be decided
.... But the question of obviousness under § 103 arises in such an unpredictable variety of ways
... that it would be an indiscreet thing to do." 763 F.2d 1406, 1411 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Judge
Rich concluded, "such is the way of the 'law.'" Id For an observation on the result of the
courts' approach, see Gambrell & Dodge, Ordinary Skill in the Art-An Enemy of the Inventor or a
Friend of the People?, in NONOBVOUSNMss, supra note 7, at 5:301, 5:303 ("Courts have generally
determined 'obviousness'.. . on the basis of their visceral feeling about the invention which the
patent seeks to protect.").
71. But cf Arnold & Lynch, Infringement of Inventions, in DEVELOPMENTS-1984 465,
484-88 (J. Marshall L. Sch. Center for Intell. Prop. L.). Authors Arnold and Lynch criticize the
argument that "the same way" and "substantially the same way" embody different tests for
equivalence in patent infringement cases. Id. (rebutting the argument as made in Harris, Three
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and ordinary meaning of the language indicates otherwise. 72 The vari-
ous standards embody a confusing, misleading range of approaches to
the question of nonobviousness. By not communicating a clear and
correct nonobviousness standard, courts are disserving the public,
investors in research and development, inventors, and members of the
bar.
73
C. Second Level Analysis Examines the Results of Use
The Supreme Court's policy-based functional approach correctly
reflects the nature of nonobviousness. 74 Altering the readily deduced
standard to embody that approach would improve the Court's test.
The Federal Circuit faces a different problem, because their
approaches do not always correctly reflect nonobviousness.
Inventors and judges interpret the suggestion standard in both an
overly strict and overly lenient manner .7  The suggestion standard
leads inventors to believe they have created nonobvious inventions in
cases where logical analysis dictates otherwise.76 Courts sometimes
hold inventions nonobvious merely because an explicit statement
directing that the invention be made is lacking in the prior art.7 In
Ambiguities of the Doctrine of Equivalents in the Federal Circuit, 69 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 91
(1987)).
72. For a recent example of the importance of the plain meaning of words when interpreting
statutes, see Int'l Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1196, 1204 (1991) (relying on plain
and ordinary meaning of words to interpret "bona fide occupational qualification").
73. For a debate on whether determinate legal meaning is possible, compare S. FisH,
Demonstration vw Persuasion: Two Models of Critical Activity, in Is THERE A TEXr IN THIS
CLASS? 356 (1980) (arguing that context and popular opinion determine meaning) with Fiss, The
Jurisprudence 1?] of Stanley Fish, 80 A. DEP'Tis ENG. BULL. 1 (1985) (arguing that normative
meanings exist).
74. See supra notes 12, 14, 36, 37 and accompanying text.
75. See also Piffat, infra note 86 (arguing that mere suggestion should be an insufficient basis
for a finding of obviousness).
76. See, e.g., In re Young, 927 F.2d 588 (Fed. Cir. 1991). One piece of prior art taught away
from another. The applicant argued that the information in one justified a conclusion that his
invention, which would be obvious in light of the other only, should be nonobvious. The court
confirmed that the prior art relied on by the applicant "did not convincingly discredit" the
stronger prior art. Id. Given weak and strong prior art, the suggestion standard allows an
applicant to argue that the mere suggestion of the weak art supports nonobviousness. A logical
deduction standard, on the other hand, would never sidetrack an inventor in these
circumstances. The inventor would logically assess the prior art and realize that the obviousness
of the invention based on convincing prior art would not be outweighed by unconvincing, albeit
contradictory, prior art. Cf. id.
77. See, e.g., Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 480 U.S. 947 (1987). In holding the invention nonobvious, the court emphasized
that no prior art suggested exactly using monoclonal antibodies in a "sandwich assay." Id. at
1380. The court appeared to be looking for an explicit statement in the prior art, although the
law requires no such statement. See 2 D. CHISUM, supra note 4, § 5.04[l], at 5-218.
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the latter cases, patents improperly capture inventions properly within
the public domain. In the former case, misunderstanding leads to
unnecessary litigation.
The motivation and suggestion of desirability standards direct mis-
leading inquiries irrelevant to the nonobviousness requirement.7"
Inquiries into motivation violate the section 103 warning that patenta-
bility shall not be negatived by the manner in which the invention was
made.79 Inquiries into desirability, and thus advantages and benefits,
are utility inquiries.8 0 Inquiries into what would motivate a person of
ordinary skill in the art enter murky and unnecessary territory."1
Motivating information in the prior art may be probative of obvi-
ousness, but should not be required. 2 Suggestion of desirability mis-
leads the inquirer.8 3  Advantages, benefits and wisdom go to the
Monoclonals of the correct specific activity were known. Hybritech, 802 F.2d at 1381. Sandwich
assays had been developed using polyclonal antibody mixtures. Id Monoclonal antibodies had
been used in related, but less complex, assays. Id. at 1380-81. Application of a logical deduction
standard would very likely have resulted in a finding of obviousness.
78. See Sakraida v. Ag Pro Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 283 (1976) ("Desirable benefits 'without
invention will not make patentability.' "). But cf. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966)
(secondary considerations focus on "economic and motivational" issues).
79. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 103 (West Supp. 1990); see also supra note 11.
80. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 1984).
81. Whether or not motive should be relevant to nonobviousness presents a complex
dilemma, not unlike the problem of what role motive should play in criminal liability. Consider
the following: "[A]n actor's ultimate reason for acting may not bearon his liability. It does not
matter whether he steals in order to buy Christmas presents for his children or to support his
heroin habit." G. FLETCHER, RETHINKiNG CRIMINAL LAW 452 (1978). Professor Fletcher
notes that although this may be only a technical fine point, "there is also a deeper point suggested
by the claim that the actor's ultimate purposes do not bear on his or her culpability for criminal
conduct." Id. Professor Fletcher alludes to whether motive ought not, in fact, be relevant to
liability.
82. Section 103 appears to explicitly bar inquiries into motivation. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 103
(West Supp. 1990). ("Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the invention
was made.") This statutory language would seem to encompass the conditions, including
mental, that the inventor operated under while inventing. See supra note 11. But see In re
Newell, 891 F.2d 899, 901 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("The motivation to make a specific structure 'is not
abstract, but practical, and is always related to the properties or uses one skilled in the art would
expect the [structure] to have, if made.' ") (quoting In re Gyurik, 596 F.2d 1012, 1018 (C.C.P.A.
1979)). Despite the court's disclaimer that the motivation at issue is specific to technical
advance, use of the term "motivation" creates the possibility that prior art describing an
unsolved problem in a way that would motivate an inventor, yet lacking the knowledge required
to achieve the solution may form the basis of obviousness holdings. But cf. Bender, Griffen and
Lipsey, Patent Decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: The Year
1985 in Review, 35 AM. U.L. REv. 995, 1004 (1986) ("To establish a prima facie case of
obviousness... the prior art references [must] provide a motivation and the ability to modify the
prior art to arrive at the claimed invention as a whole.").
83. For example, prior art could stress the desirability of certain highly beneficial, but
theoretical, pharmaceuticals to treat cancer. Under the suggestion of desirability standard,
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usefulness of the invention, a section 101 inquiry.84 The factors creat-
ing motive or desire in any individual are too imprecise to be useful in
assessing technical advance made by the invention.85
Reasonable expectation of success is a misleading standard of inde-
terminate strictness.86 Reasonable expectation, like ready deduction,
gives the person of ordinary skill an active role in nonobviousness
analysis. That active role makes reasonable expectation a useful stan-
dard, easier to grasp than the passive tests.87 However, the standard
gives no indication of what degree of expectation is reasonable or how
to test for it.88  Courts frequently apply this standard in areas of
unpredictable art.89 By using an expectation standard, the unpredict-
ability of the art and the inventor's own expectations take on signifi-
cant evidentiary value in the mind of the inventor.' Confusion
results, because courts employ the standard to downplay the impor-
tance of a certain degree of unpredictability.9
developing those pharmaceuticals would be obvious despite no information in the prior art on
how to even begin making them.
84. The nonobviousness standard exists to protect knowledge in the public domain, not to
reward the development of useful technology. Utility is a section 101 inquiry. 35 U.S.C.A. § 101
(West 1984); see also WEBSTER'S, supra note 58, at 2524 (useful means serviceable for a beneficial
end or object and is synonymous with advantageous).
85. The plain and ordinary meanings of the words leave misleading and irrelevant
connotations muddying the inquiry. Cf In re Newell, 891 F.2d 899, 901 (Fed. Cir. 1989)
(equating motivation with suggestion of desirability). It is not clear why more precise and less
misleading terms are not used.
86. Cf Ex parte Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1425 (B.P.A.I. 1987) (the investigators were
denied a patent on nonobviousness grounds although they had been able to modify the prior art
procedures). The modification probably did not follow logically from those prior art procedures.
87. See supra text accompanying notes 58, 64.
88. For another critique focusing on the suggestion and reasonable expectation of success
standards, see Piffat, The "Obvious to Try" Doctrine and Biotechnology: A Comparison of Patent
Cases in the United States and in the United Kingdom, 72 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y
956, 968-69 (1990).
89. See supra note 52 (discussing "obvious-to-try").
90. See supra text accompanying notes 65-67. Concern that the court employs standards
focusing on the motivations and expectations of the inventor are resolved by refocusing the
standards onto the invention itself. Cf Witherspoon, Preface to NONOBVIOUSNESS, supra note 7,
at viii (proposing that section 103 should read: "A patent may not be obtained ... if ... the
subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a
person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains." The proposed
change addresses a concern that, as written, "it can be mischievous, by directing attention to
differences rather than to results").
91. Several recent cases illustrate the conflict between inventors' emphasis and courts'
deemphasis of unpredictability. See, e.g., In re Eli Lilly & Co., 902 F.2d 943, 946, 948 (Fed. Cir.
1990); In re O'Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 902-04 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Ex parte Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d




III. ACHIEVING A CORRECT NONOBVIOUSNESS
INTERPRETATION WITH A LOGICAL
DEDUCTION STANDARD
Courts must apply a nonobviousness standard that reveals rather
than masks the essence of the nonobviousness inquiry. The correct
standard must clarify for courts how the analysis should proceed.92
That standard must also carefully reflect Constitutional policies.93
Finally, the optimal nonobviousness standard must prevent courts
from straying into inquiries irrelevant to technical advancement.94
A. Advantages of a Logical Deduction Standard
The logical deduction standard reflects the policies and technical
nature of nonobviousness. Inventions that courts, via the person of
ordinary skill in the art, can trace by logic from the prior art are
inventions that do not deserve patent protection. Logical deduction is
free from intangible qualities such as motivation and desirability. A
functional standard directing logical analysis of technical advance-
ment will prevent courts from intuitively reacting to inventions. The
inquiry remains focused on the technical merit of the invention. A
nonobviousness standard that gives the person of ordinary skill in the
art an active rather than passive role parallels the reality of the inven-
tive process. Logical deduction does not -mislead courts into thinking
that inventions are obvious only when derived by analysis requiring
only simple, almost automatic responses. Acting in concert with other
92. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (nonobviousness analysis is determined by how
the analysis functions, not how it is labelled).
93. The twentieth century cases discussed supra note 39 should not be viewed as creating a
special scrutiny standard for combination inventions, but a clear example of the general scrutiny
approach at work. See also J. BocnNOvic, supra note 40.
94. Reformulating the standards may result in a change in the number or scope of granted
patents. Any changes could be balanced by reactive changes in other patent law doctrine.
Larger numbers of granted patents need not result. For example, the utility requirement has
long had a very low threshold. Given the clear constitutional mandate to promote progress in
science and the useful arts, a higher threshold utility requirement is justified. For background on
the utility requirement, see, ag., D. CmisuM, supra note 4, at § 4.01. Were greater numbers of
patents to be granted in "crowded" arts, narrowing the scope of patent claims would address
concerns of overmonopolization. Patent law requires that patent claims be supported by the
specifications of the patent. By tying the scope of claims more directly t6 the specifications of the
patent, the total amount of information covered by patents may be decreased to or below the
present level. See, ag., Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1213-14
(Fed. Cir. 1991). Conversely, were the number of legally nonobvious inventions to decrease, the
present breadth of patented subject matter may be retained by increased claim scope. Expanded
claim scope on fewer inventions is supported by the tradition of granting broader claims to
"pioneering" inventions. Presumably, if fewer patents are granted, those granted will protect
"more nonobvious" and thus "more pioneering" inventions.
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patent law doctrine, the logical deduction standard fulfills the Consti-
tutional policies stressed by the Supreme Court in its intellectual prop-
erty decisions.
95
B. Applying the Logical Deduction Standard
Courts are much more likely to understand and correctly apply
nonobviousness when using a logical deduction standard. Logical
deduction directs courts to make an objective determination of how a
person of ordinary skill in the art would logically analyze all public
information pertinent to the inventor's problem. A judge or practi-
tioner will much more readily grasp a standard requiring logical anal-
ysis of existing information.
The logical deduction standard eliminates the ambiguities of the
suggestion standard. Asking a court, particularly a district court rela-
tively unfamiliar with technology and patent litigation, to understand
what the prior art "suggests" is asking for trouble.96 Courts will still
need expert witnesses to explain how logical conclusions based on
understanding at the time of invention could or could not lead a per-
son of ordinary skill to the invention as a solution to the inventor's
problem. But technical difficulty is no stranger to patent litigation. At
least judges will have a functional test to use when deciphering the
evidence. And practitioners will be more confident of whether their
clients meet that functional test.
The logical deduction standard addresses fact situations currently
analyzed under a reasonable expectation of success standard. Uncer-
tainty and unpredictability in the prior art act like gates in the flow of
logic. If the uncertainty is too great, the logical flow stops-the inven-
tion is nonobvious. If the unpredictability is low, the logic flows past
and on to the conclusion-the invention is obvious. Known and
unknown characteristics of components of an invention affect the anal-
ysis the same way. An inventor that relies on a known characteristic
bases that reliance on a logical conclusion regarding the component's
function. Conversely, inventions based on new uses resulting from
unknown characteristics cannot follow logically from knowledge of
prior art.97 In addition, courts and practitioners will understand the
95. See supra notes 12, 29.
96. Cf Baechtold, supra note 35 ("Recite the Graham formula to a judge and his eyes will
glaze over.").
97. Perhaps incongruously, if an inventor discovers a new characteristic of a known
component, the inventor cannot "repatent" the same component or combination. The inventor
has merely discovered a new property of an existing device. New properties cannot be patented




test better when it is framed from the perspective of an active rather
than passive inventor. Implying that yet undiscovered knowledge
exists in the prior art presents a premise impossible to test. On the
other hand, when advances are made, they are in fact made by individ-
uals who were able to make obvious or nonobvious conclusions based
on the information available to them.
IV. CONCLUSION
The courts should apply a nonobviousness standard that correctly
reflects the Constitutional and ftmetional nature of the nonobviousness
inquiry. The proposed logical deduction standard should be adopted
as that standard. The proposed standard provides courts with an
active, logical approach to the nonobviousness determination. It
avoids irrelevant inquiries and tests only technical advancement. This
standard satisfies Constitutional policies that seek to protect knowl-
edge in the public domain. Courts applying this standard would uni-
formly respect the strict policy-based scrutiny developed by the
Supreme Court. Logical deduction is, after all, "the Thing to Do."
Kathleen N. McKereghan
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advantage of the new property. In addition, the method of use must be different than known uses
of the device. See, eg., In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688, 692 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
